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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Matthew Larry Pridgen appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
his guilty plea to first-degree stalking.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A no-contact order prohibiting Pridgen from having contact with Carrie
Williams was entered pursuant to Pridgen's charge and conviction for domestic
battery. (Confidential exhibits, pp.16, 23. 1 ) In April 2013, in violation of that order,
Pridgen wrote a letter to Williams. (Confidential exhibits, pp.16-17.) In May 2013,
Pridgen called Williams from a pay phone.

(Confidential exhibits, p.14.)

In June

2013, a neighbor who was aware of the no-contact order called the police after she
observed Pridgen entering Williams' residence. (R., pp.14-15.) Before police could
arrive, Pridgen crawled into Williams' bed, put his arm around her neck, and pulled
her towards him. (R., p.16.) Pridgen told Williams that he did not care about the nocontact order and that he just wanted to be with her. (Id.) Williams told Pridgen that
he needed to leave. (Id.) Pridgen began to take off Williams' pants before Williams
squirmed away.

(Id.) Soon after, an officer arrived at the residence and arrested

Pridgen. (R., pp.14-15.)
The state filed a complaint charging Pridgen with felony stalking, burglary, and
attempted rape. (R., pp.20-21.) The magistrate court dismissed these charges at
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The PSI, motions and orders relating to the competency evaluation, and the
competency evaluation itself, are contained within the electronic file, "MATTHEW
LARRY PRIDGEN CR13-1855 CONFIDENTIAL.pdf." Citations to page numbers of
the "Confidential exhibits" refer to the page numbers of this file.
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the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, and instead, with the consent of the state,
bound Pridgen over to the district court on a charge of battery with the intent to
commit a serious felony. (R., p.42; Prelim Tr., p.63, L.6 - p.69, L.9.) In a second
amended information, the state charged Pridgen with felony battery with intent to
commit a serious felony,

misdemeanor unlawful entry, and two counts

of

misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order. (R., pp.84-86.)
While the case was pending, Pridgen's attorney filed a motion requesting that
the district court order an evaluation to assess Pridgen's competence to stand trial.
(R., pp.87-88; Confidential exhibits, p.1.)

(Confidential exhibits pp.2-3.)

The district court granted the motion.

However, Pridgen refused to fully participate in the

evaluation, and the evaluator was unable to form an opinion with regard to Pridgen's
competency. (Confidential exhibits pp.8-11.)

At a subsequent hearing, Pridgen

agreed to participate in a second evaluation on the ground that it would be limited to
the relevant competency questions - whether he understood the nature of the
proceedings against him and whether he was able to assist in his own defense.
(3/31/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-15; p.25, L.12-p.26, L.16.)

However, Pridgen's counsel

later informed the court that the evaluator refused to do a "piecemeal" evaluation.
(5/12/14 Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.4.) The case remained scheduled for trial.
Shortly before trial, the state and Pridgen entered into a plea agreement,
pursuant to which Pridgen pied guilty to an amended charge of felony stalking, and
the state agreed to dismiss the three misdemeanor charges. (6/3/14 Tr., p.5, L.6 p.6, L.24; R., p.150.)

The state agreed to recommend probation if Pridgen was

accepted into mental health court. (6/3/14 Tr., p.5, L.6 - p.6, L.24; R., p.150.) The
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state filed an amended information which contained the felony stalking charge. (R.,
pp.151-152.) Prior to sentencing, Pridgen moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R.,
pp.178-179.) After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.191

92;

see generally 8/13/14 Tr.)
The district court imposed a unified four and one-half year sentence with two
and one-half years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.206-208.) Pridgen timely
appealed. (R., pp.209-212.) At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction,
the district court suspended the previously-imposed sentence and placed Pridgen on
probation for three and one-half years. (Supp. R., pp.31-34; 2/13/15 Tr., p.20, L.14 p.26, L.8.)

3

ISSUES
Pridgen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by abandoning its order
for a competency evaluation after finding reason to doubt Mr.
Pridgen's competence?

2.

Is Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea void because the district court had no
jurisdiction over the improperly-amended third Information
charging Mr. Pridgen with first degree stalking?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr.
Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Mr.
Pridgen had just reasons to withdraw the plea?

(Appellant's brief, p.12)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Pridgen failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion
with respect to its determinations regarding Pridgen's competency to enter a
guilty plea?

2.

Has Pridgen failed to demonstrate that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
accept his guilty plea to first-degree stalking?

3.

Has Pridgen failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion
by denying Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Pridgen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
With Respect To Its Determinations Regarding Pridgen's Competency To Enter A
Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Pridgen contends that the district court abused its discretion by not sua

sponte continuing to attempt to assess Pridgen's competency after Pridgen's

counsel withdrew his request for the court to do so. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-16.)
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion under
the relevant law.

B.

Standard of Review
The decision whether to order a psychological evaluation to determine a

defendant's competence to stand trial is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 325, 271 P.3d 712, 723 (2012). Unless
the district court's finding is clearly erroneous, the appellate court will affirm a district
court's determinations regarding a defendant's competency. State v. Hawkins, 148
Idaho 774, 777, 229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion With Respect To Its
Determinations Regarding Pridgen's Competency
Idaho Code§ 18-210 provides:
No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense
shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an
offense so long as such incapacity endures.

5

"must

If there is a reason to doubt a defendant's competency, the

order a 'qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon
the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense or understand
the proceedings."' Hanson, 152 Idaho at 325, 271 P.3d at 723 (quoting I.C. § 18211 (1)). The test for determining a defendant's competence to stand trial or to enter
a guilty plea is whether he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational,
as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him."

kt

(citations and

quotations omitted).
"There are 'no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed."'

kt

(quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420

U.S. 162, 180 (1975)). Although a defendant's attorney's input on the need for a
competency evaluation is relevant, it "certainly is not determinative."

kt

(citations

and quotations omitted).
Idaho Code § 18-211 (6) provides that "[i)f the examination cannot be
conducted by reason of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate therein, the
report shall so state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as to whether such
unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental disease or defect." The
statute does not assign any particular duty to the district court in the event that an
evaluator is precluded from making a competency determination on a defendant who
is unwilling to participate in the examination.
In this case, Pridgen's counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court
order an evaluation to assess whether Pridgen was competent to stand trial. (R.,
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pp.87-88; Confidential exhibits, p.1.) The motion asserted that there was "reason to
believe that the Defendant lack[ed] the capacity to understand the proceedings
against him and may be unable to assist in his own defense," but did not provide any
specific information to support this assertion.

(Confidential exhibits, p.1.)

The

district court did not expressly find that there was reason to believe that Pridgen
lacked competency to stand trial, but it granted the motion and ordered the
evaluation. (Confidential exhibits, pp.2-3.)
Pridgen was "marginally cooperative" with the competency evaluator.
(Confidential exhibits, p.11.)

Pridgen told the evaluator that he had agreed to

participate in the evaluation in order to give himself and his attorney more time to
prepare his defense. (Confidential exhibits, p.10.) The evaluator noted that "[t]here
was no evidence of disturbances of perceptions or thought which would have been
suggestive of a psychotic disorder." (Id.)

Pridgen told the evaluator that he had

never been diagnosed with or treated for any mental illness.

(Id.)

However, the

evaluator concluded that "[i]t was not possible, within the constraints of this
evaluation, to determine whether the lack of compliance of this individual was due to
an

inability,

an

unwillingness,

a mental health

issue,

personality features,

interpersonal features, oppositional tendencies, or a combination."

(Confidential

exhibits, p.11.) Therefore, the evaluator was "unable to form an opinion regarding
mental health issues, or to assess [Pridgen's] basic understanding of legal concepts
and ability to assist in his own defense." (Id.)
At a subsequent hearing, Pridgen's counsel expressed that he was still
concerned about Pridgen's competence, and that there were "several pieces of
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evidence" that Pridgen was not permitting him to disclose that would "strongly show
that he has competency issues."

(3/31/14

, p.5, L.13 - p.8, L.24.)

Without

providing specifics, Pridgen's counsel also stated that Pridgen "cannot make
informed decisions about his defense," and "gets confused and ... very upset."
(3/31/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-18.) Pridgen's counsel proposed that the court either order
Pridgen to submit to another competency evaluation, or order the involuntary
hospitalization of Pridgen and require him to undergo treatment. (3/31/14 Tr., p.6,
L.20 - p.7, L.25.)
Pridgen then spoke on his own behalf and expressed his concerns about the
"reliability" of the evaluation, and indicated that the scope of the evaluation was
broader than he had anticipated. (3/31/14 Tr., p.15, L.18 - p.18, L.8.) Upon further
discussion between the district court and the parties, the court expressed a
willingness to enter a new order that would direct the competency evaluator to limit
its examination and conclusions to the question of Pridgen's capacity to understand
the proceedings against him, and to assist in his own defense. (3/31/14 Tr., p.18,
L.9 - p.26, L.5.)

Pridgen indicated that he would agree to participate in such an

evaluation. (3/31/14 Tr., p.26, Ls.7-16; p.30, Ls.3-4.) Pridgen's counsel stated that
he would prepare an order consistent with the district court's proposal. (3/31/14 Tr.,
p.26, L.17- p.28, L.21.)
By the time of the next court hearing approximately two months later, Pridgen
was represented by new counsel.

(See generally 5/9/14 Tr.)

The district court

obseNed that Pridgen's prior counsel did not prepare a new order for a competency
evaluation.

(5/9/14 Tr., p.14, L.5 - p.15, L.14.)
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At the next status conference,

Pridgen's counsel informed the court that Pridgen's prior counsel had contacted the
evaluator, but that the evaluator refused to do a "piecemeal, part here, part there
type of an evaluation."

(5/12/14 Tr., p.19, L.18 - p.20, L.4.)

Pridgen's counsel

further represented that Pridgen's prior counsel had intended to withdraw his motion
for a competency evaluation. (5/12/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-4.) Pridgen's counsel did not
ask the court to order any additional evaluations, to hold an additional competency
hearing, or to otherwise further pursue a determination on the question of Pridgen's
competency.

Approximately three weeks later, on the date of the scheduled jury

trial, Pridgen pied guilty to the amended felony stalking charge.

(See generally

6/3/14 Tr.)
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion
under the applicable law. As provided by I.C. § 18-211(1), the court appointed a
licensed psychologist to evaluate whether Pridgen was competent to stand trial.
After the evaluator concluded that it could not make a competency determination in
light of Pridgen's refusal to fully participate, the district court indicated its willingness
to order a second competency evaluation.

At this point, Pridgen's counsel

essentially withdrew his request for the court to facilitate future attempts to evaluate
Pridgen's competence. Idaho Code§ 18-211 did not require the district court to take
any additional actions regarding this issue at this point.
While a trial judge is "under a continuing duty to observe a defendant's ability
to understand the proceedings against him," State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72,
P.3d 278, 297 (2003), there is no indication in the record that the district court
violated its duty in this case. Aside from the unspecified concerns expressed by

g

Pridgen's counsel (who later withdrew his motion for a competency evaluation),
there is no indication in the record that Pridgen was incompetent to stand trial or to
enter a guilty plea. A review of the hearing transcripts reveals that while Pridgen
was occasionally long-winded and somewhat unfocused, he was able to express
himself coherently, and demonstrated an understanding of the criminal proceedings
against him. (See~. 3/31/14 Tr., p.15, L.1 - p.18, L.8; 6/3/14 Tr., p.7, L.14- p.16,
L.8; 9/16/14 Tr., p.47, L.2- p.55, L.14.) In particular, Pridgen was able to coherently
explain his concerns that the first competency evaluation exceeded the scope of the
relevant question of his competence. (3/31/14 Tr., p.15, L.1 - p.18, L.8.) In addition,
despite an extensive criminal history that includes at thirteen misdemeanor criminal
convictions, there is no indication in the record that Pridgen was previously declared
incompetent to stand trial, or that he even had been diagnosed with or treated for
any particular mental health condition or disorder.

(Confidential exhibits, pp.8-11,

20-26.)
In light of this absence of evidence that Pridgen might be incompetent to
stand trial, the district court was not required to sua sponte order additional
competency evaluations in response to Pridgen's counsel's vague expressed
concerns, particularly where counsel later essentially retracted those concerns by
electing not to further pursue the competency issue. Pridgen has therefore failed to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.
In a footnote contained in his Appellant's brief, Pridgen also appears to
contend that Pridgen's conviction violated his constitutional due process rights.
(Appellant's brief, p.13 n.7 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,378 (1966)). The
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conviction of a legally incompetent person violates due process, and where the
evidence before the court raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant's
competency, due process requires that a competency hearing be held. Robinson,
383 U.S. at 378-385. In this case, as discussed above, the district court conducted
a competency hearing and ordered a competency evaluation even though Pridgen's
counsel's expressed concerns about Pridgen's competence were unspecified and
unsupported.

Because the record is otherwise devoid of evidence indicating that

Pridgen was incompetent to stand trial, the district court was not required to conduct
additional

hearings

or

order additional evaluations after Pridgen's counsel

abandoned the competency issue.
Based upon the evidence before it regarding Pridgen's ability to assist in his
own defense and to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, the
district court acted well within its discretion in declining to sua sponte order an
additional competency evaluation, or to otherwise further pursue the question of
Pridgen's competency after Pridgen's attorney withdrew his request for the court to
do so. This Court should therefore affirm Pridgen's conviction.

11.
Pridgen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To
Accept His Guilty Plea To First-Degree Stalking
A.

Introduction
Pridgen contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty

plea to first-degree stalking. (R., pp.16-20.) Specifically, Pridgen contends that the
stalking charge, which the state included in its third amended information, was not
subject to a probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing as required by

11

state law.

(Id.)

Pridgen's argument fails because his guilty plea

charge

waived his right to a preliminary hearing.

8.

Standard of Review
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any

time and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d
699, 701 (2004) (citing Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995),
and State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998)).

C.

The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Accept Pridgen's Guilty
Plea To Felony Stalking
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general

type or class of dispute." Idaho courts have "subject matter jurisdiction over a crime
if any essential element of the crime, including the result, occurs within Idaho." State
v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1992).

"The information,

indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho
confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223,
228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004).
subject matter jurisdiction.

An invalid charging document does not confer

State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840-41, 252 P.3d 1255,

1258-1259 (2011).
The

Idaho Supreme Court has held that a charging

indictment is

jurisdictionally invalid where the defendant was acquitted of the charged offense at
trial and the district court allowed a post-acquittal amendment to a non-included
offense. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 526-527, 261 P.3d 519, 520-521 (2011) ("To
allow a prosecutor to amend an indictment to charge an offense other than that for
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which the defendant was held to answer would permit the prosecutor to, in essence,
become the grand jury."). Thus, the jury's acquittal on the only valid charge against
Flegel ended the district court's jurisdiction over the case.

kL

More recently, in an opinion which is now pending review by the Idaho
Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied Flegel more broadly, holding that
a pretrial amendment to a non-included offense rendered the charging indictment
jurisdictionally invalid even where the defendant pied guilty to the new charge, and
even where there was no intervening trial acquittal of the original charge. State v.
Schmeirer,

Idaho_,

P.3d _ , 2014 WL 6652924 (Ct. App. 2014), petition

for review granted. Flegel does not control the outcome in this case, and the state
asserts that Schmeirer was wrongly decided.
In this case, Pridgen waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony
stalking charge by pleading guilty to that charge. It is well-settled that a valid plea of
guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. State v. Dunlap,
123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho
642,643,671 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983).
In Fowler, the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction because of
a defect in the preliminary hearing process.

Fowler asserted that "the magistrate

committed prejudicial error in letting the state amend the complaint against him - to
include the restaurant burglary charge - during the course of the preliminary
hearing." Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106. The Idaho Court of Appeals
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concluded that Fowler waived

his right

challenge the probable cause

determination regarding the added charge once he pied guilty:
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his right to
contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of a preliminary
hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to require the
accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily
and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. Here
Fowler does not attack the entry and acceptance of his plea. His plea of
guilty to the restaurant burglary therefore constituted a waiver of the
procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the
preliminary hearing itself, on that charge.
Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added, internal citations
omitted).
Likewise, in this case, Pridgen's plea of guilty to the felony stalking charge
constituted a waiver of the procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had
expressly waived the preliminary hearing itself. Further, unlike in Flegel, there was
no intervening acquittal which ended the district court's jurisdiction over the charging
information.

Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept

Pridgen's plea to the felony stalking charge.
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
accept his guilty plea to felony stalking. This Court should therefore affirm Pridgen's
judgment of conviction.

111.
Pridgen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Pridgen's Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea

14

Introduction
Pridgen contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

(Appellant's brief, pp.20-28.) A review of the

record reveals that Pridgen has failed to establish either that his plea was
constitutionally invalid, or there was any other just reason for the withdrawal of his
plea.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330,
334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings

if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho
159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 256, 869
P.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1994 ).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Pridgen's Motion
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is imposed.

I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right,
however.

State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990);

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears the burden of
proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn.
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Hanslovan, 147

Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-375, 825 P.2d 94,
App. 1992).
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the court must determine, as a
threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State v. Rodriguez, 118
Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). As a matter of constitutional
due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is "entered by one fully aware of
the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 755 (1970). If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court
must determine whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw
the plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536,211 P.3d at 781. The good faith, credibility,
and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his
plea are matters for the trial court to decide.

kl at 537, 211

P.3d at 782.

A district court may also consider prejudice to the state in determining
whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Henderson, 113
Idaho 411, 414, 744 P.2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Hanslovan, 147 Idaho
at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 ("Once the defendant has met this burden [of showing just
cause], the state may avoid withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the existence of
prejudice."
After his guilty plea, but prior to sentencing, Pridgen filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

(R., pp.178-179.)

Pridgen asserted: (1) his plea was involuntary
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he did not understand the terms

the plea agreement; and

was

crime. (Id.)
At the hearing on his motion, Pridgen testified that his prior appointed counsel
did not timely provide him with discovery, and that when he did eventually receive it,
he learned that the allegations being made against him were not true. (8/13/14 Tr.,
p.6, L.23 - p.8, L.24.)

However, Pridgen also acknowledged that he received

discovery by April 2014, two months before he pied guilty in June 2014. (8/13/14 Tr.,
p.8, Ls.17-24.) Pridgen also testified that he didn't understand the plea agreement
and that at the time he entered the plea he was "being pushed in a direction that [he]
didn't want to go [by] a previous attorney."

(8/13/14 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.7.)

However, Pridgen also acknowledged that this "previous attorney," Christopher
Schwartz, was no longer representing him at the time he entered his guilty plea.
(8/13/14 Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.8.) After the state elicited this information on crossexamination, Pridgen set forth a different argument - that his new counsel, Tyler
Wirick, was not prepared for trial. (8/13/14 Tr., p.13, L.1 -p.14, L.4.) Pridgen further
testified that Wirick did not explain to him the nature of the charges against him, or
inform him of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. (8/13/14 Tr., p.16, L.9 p.17, L.12.) Finally, Pridgen testified that during the change of plea hearing, he did
not understand the district court's explanation of his rights or of the charges against
him. (8/13/14 Tr., p.18, L.2-p.19, L.3.)
The state opposed Pridgen's motion, and asserted that it would suffer
prejudice should the court permit Pridgen to withdraw his plea. (8/13/14 Tr., p.30,
Ls.6-15.)

Specifically, the state represented to the court that Pridgen "effectively
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terrified the victim," that the victim had moved out of state and was reluctant
cooperate with the prosecution, and that the state may not be able to go forward
should Pridgen be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Id.)
The district court denied Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
pp.191-192; 8/13/14 Tr., p.31, L. 19 - p.35, L.9.)

The court first concluded that

Pridgen's testimony at the hearing was "calculated" and "evasive."
p.32, Ls.5-9.)

(R.,

(8/13/14 Tr.,

This credibility determination cannot be disturbed on appeal.

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. The district court further concluded
that the colloquy conducted at the change of plea hearing adequately informed
Pridgen of his relevant rights and of the nature of the plea agreement. (8/13/14 Tr.,
p.32, L.16 - p.33, L.23.)

Finally, the court concluded that at the change of plea

hearing, Pridgen indicated that he understood the charges against him and the
nature of the plea agreement. (8/13/14 Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.23.)
A review of the transcript of the change of plea hearing colloquy supports the
conclusions of the district court.

(6/3/14 Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.15, L.11.)

Pridgen

specifically testified that that his attorney's recitation of the plea agreement reflected
his understanding of the agreement, that he understood the rights explained to him
by the court, that he did not need to speak further with his attorney about those
rights, that he was not under any treatment for any mental illness, and that he was
not taking any medications that would affect his ability to make a voluntary decision
to plead guilty. (Id.) Finally, the court specifically informed Pridgen that he would not
be able to withdraw his guilty plea after he entered it. (6/3/14 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10,
L.1.) Pridgen cannot show that the district court abused its discretion.
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On appeal, Pridgen also asserts that his plea agreement was unenforceable
because it was not subject to valid consideration.

(Appellant's brief, pp.26-28.)

Specifically, Pridgen, relying on his arguments with respect to the court's jurisdiction
over the third amended charging information (see Section II, supra), contends that
the state could not have lawfully fulfilled its promise to amend Pridgen's charge for
felony battery with the intent to commit a serious felony to the charge of felony
stalking.

(Id; citing State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537

(2010)).

Pridgen's argument fails because, as discussed above, the district court

had jurisdiction to accept Pridgen's plea to the amended charge.
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate either that his plea was constitutionally
invalid, or that there exists other "just cause" for the withdrawal of his plea. He has
also failed to demonstrate that the district court acted arbitrarily, as opposed to
exercising sound judicial judgment, in denying his motion to withdraw his plea.

He

has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
conviction entered upon Pridgen's guilty plea to felony stalking.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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